Evolution and Cryptographic Challenges of Multi-Pre-Shared Key (mPSK) Systems in WPA 2 and WPA 3 Wi-Fi Environments

January 20, 2026 | Marek Hajduczenia

The Identity Crisis in Pre-Shared Key Networks

The fundamental architecture of Wi-Fi security has historically been bifurcated into two distinct paradigms: the simplicity of Pre-Shared Key (PSK) for personal and small business use, and the robust, identity-centric IEEE Std 802.1X (WPA-Enterprise) for corporate environments. For over a decade, network architects have grappled with a substantial gray area that exists between these two extremes: environments requiring the ease of use of a simple password but demanding the segmentation, auditing, and revocation capabilities of an enterprise system. This operational gap birthed the technology known variously as Multi-Pre-Shared Key (mPSK), Identity PSK (iPSK), Dynamic PSK (DPSK), or Private PSK (PPSK), depending on the specific vendor terminology. In this document, a most common publicly recognized term of mPSK is used to designate any variant of these technologies.

The premise of mPSK is deceptive in its simplicity: a single Service Set Identifier (SSID) is broadcast, yet it accepts thousands of different passphrases, each mathematically binding the connecting client to a specific identity profile, Virtual Local Area Network (VLAN), or Quality of Service (QoS) policy. This technology became the cornerstone of connectivity for sectors where IEEE Std 802.1X was infeasible due to client limitations or user friction: specifically in Multi-Dwelling Units (MDUs) like university dormitories, assisted living facilities, and increasingly, the expansive landscape of the Internet of Things (IoT).

However, the transition from Wi-Fi Protected Access 2 (WPA2) to Wi-Fi Protected Access 3 (WPA3) has precipitated a crisis in the domain of mPSK support. While WPA2's permissive cryptographic structure allowed vendors to implement proprietary "try-and-match" mechanisms to support multiple keys, WPA3’s reliance on the Simultaneous Authentication of Equals (SAE) protocol introduces strict zero-knowledge proof requirements that fundamentally conflict with the traditional operation of mPSK. This report provides an exhaustive analysis of the mPSK landscape, contrasting the flexible but insecure implementations of the WPA2 era with the rigid, identity-dependent architectures required by WPA3. It explores the vendor-specific engineering solutions from Cisco, Aruba, Ruckus, and Juniper Mist, and analyzes the collision course between network security requirements and the privacy-preserving MAC address randomization features of modern mobile operating systems.

Theoretical Framework of mPSK Architectures

To understand the profound impact of WPA3 on mPSK, one must first dissect the operational mechanics of the technology within the legacy WPA2 framework. mPSK is not a standard defined by the IEEE Std 802.11 Working Group; rather, it is a collection of proprietary vendor innovations engineered on top of the standard 4-Way Handshake.

The Operational Value Proposition

The primary utility of mPSK lies in its ability to resolve the "shared secret" dilemma. In a standard WPA2-Personal network, every user shares the same passphrase. This creates three critical vulnerabilities:

Lack of Attribution: Network administrators cannot distinguish between users based solely on authentication credentials, as the credential is identical for all clients.
Revocation Friction: Revoking access for a single compromised device or departed employee requires changing the passphrase for the entire organization, triggering a massive reconfiguration event for all legitimate devices.
Decryption Vulnerability: In WPA2, any user possessing the Pre-Shared Key can capture the 4-Way Handshake of another user and derive the Pairwise Transient Key (PTK), effectively decrypting their traffic. This makes standard PSK unsuitable for environments where users should not spy on one another, such as a dormitory or a shared office.

mPSK mitigates these issues by assigning a unique passphrase to each device or user group. Upon authentication, the network infrastructure identifies the specific key used and maps the session to a specific policy. If a device is stolen, only that specific key is revoked. Furthermore, because the Pairwise Master Key (PMK) is derived from the unique passphrase, User A cannot decrypt User B's traffic, even though they are connected to the same SSID.

WPA2 Implementation Mechanics for mPSK: The "Try-and-Match" vs. RADIUS Lookup Methods

In the WPA2-Personal environment, the authentication process utilizes the 4-Way Handshake to prove possession of the PSK without sending it over the air. The critical flexibility in WPA2 is that the Wireless Access Point (WAP) does not need to commit to a specific PMK before receiving the client's first message in the handshake (Message 1 or 2 depending on the perspective). This allowed vendors to implement three primary methods for mPSK.

The Local Key Iteration Method

In smaller deployments or local-controller modes, the WAP or the wireless controller maintains a local database of configured passphrases. When a client attempts to connect, the infrastructure iterates through its list of stored keys, attempting to validate the Message Integrity Code (MIC) presented by the client. If a match is found, the connection proceeds, and the attributes associated with that specific key (e.g., VLAN 10 for IoT devices) are applied. This method is computationally inexpensive for small key lists but scales poorly as the number of keys increases into the thousands.

The MAC-Based RADIUS Key Retrieval Method (Pre-Authentication)

For enterprise-scale deployments involving tens of thousands of devices, vendors leveraged the MAC address as a lookup key. In this workflow:

The client initiates an association request.
The WAP/Controller halts the process and sends a RADIUS Access-Request to a backend AAA server, treating the MAC address as the identity, before the cryptographic handshake can complete.
The AAA server looks up the MAC address in its database, retrieves the specific passphrase associated with that device, and returns it to the controller via a RADIUS Vendor-Specific Attribute (VSA).
The controller uses this specific passphrase to complete the 4-Way Handshake with the client.

This method effectively turns the PSK authentication into a two-factor process: the device must possess the correct MAC address (registered in the database) and the correct passphrase. This architecture became the industry standard for mPSK, known as "Identity PSK" (Cisco) or "MPSK" (Aruba), effectively bridging the gap between personal and enterprise security.

The PSK-Based Identity Lookup Method (Cryptographic Verification)

This alternative architecture, often termed PSK-Based Identity Lookup or External PSK Verification, removes the requirement for every client device to be pre-registered by its MAC address. Instead, the passphrase itself serves as the identifier, and the key exchange mechanism is used to verify which PSK was used by the client. This is often preferred when administrators want to manage accounts (or groups) rather than individual MAC addresses.

This flow hinges on the WAP pausing the standard WPA2 4-Way Handshake (4WH) after receiving the second message (Message 2), which contains the Message Integrity Code (MIC) from the client. Since the WAP does not know the correct PSK to verify this MIC, it delegates the cryptographic challenge to the RADIUS server.

Client Initiates Connection: The client (with an unknown MAC) connects using its unique PSK and begins the 4-Way Handshake.
WAP Receives Handshake Message 2: The client sends EAPOL-Key Message 2 (M2), which contains the client nonce (SNonce) and the Message Integrity Code (MIC). The WAP cannot verify the MIC because it does not know the correct PSK needed for key derivation.
AP Probes RADIUS: The WAP pauses the 4WH (or lets it timeout, which is expected) and sends a RADIUS Access-Request packet. This request includes the client’s MAC address and the raw cryptographic parameters from M2 (ANonce, SNonce, MIC) within a RADIUS VSA, for example, a Ruckus-DPSK-Params VSA.

The RADIUS server performs the iterative search through its database of valid PSKs using the cryptographic parameters provided by the WAP (SNonce, MIC, ANonce, Client MAC, WAP MAC).

Given EAPOL Message 2 from client contains:

SNonce (32 bytes) - Client's random nonce
MIC (16 bytes) - Message Integrity Code
ANonce is known (from Message 1, sent by WAP)
Client MAC and WAP MAC are known

The RADIUS server then performs the following operations (described below in terms of a pseudocode):

FOR EACH psk IN database:
# Step 1: Derive PMK from PSK
PMK = PBKDF2-SHA1(
password = psk,
salt = SSID,
iterations = 4096,
key_length = 256 bits
)

# Step 2: Derive PTK from PMK
# PTK = PRF-512(PMK, "Pairwise key expansion",
# Min(AP_MAC, STA_MAC) || Max(AP_MAC, STA_MAC) ||
# Min(ANonce, SNonce) || Max(ANonce, SNonce))

data = "Pairwise key expansion" || 0x00 ||
min(AP_MAC, Client_MAC) || max(AP_MAC, Client_MAC) ||
min(ANonce, SNonce) || max(ANonce, SNonce)

PTK = PRF-512(PMK, data)

# PTK contains:
# - KCK (Key Confirmation Key): First 16 bytes
# - KEK (Key Encryption Key): Next 16 bytes
# - TK (Temporal Key): Remaining bytes

KCK = PTK[0:16]

# Step 3: Compute expected MIC
# MIC protects EAPOL Message 2
EAPOL_Msg2_without_MIC = <message 2 with MIC field zeroed>

Expected_MIC = HMAC-SHA1-128(
key = KCK,
data = EAPOL_Msg2_without_MIC
)

# Step 4: Compare
IF Expected_MIC == Received_MIC:
# FOUND THE CORRECT PSK!
account = lookup_account_for_psk(psk)
RETURN Access-Accept with account policies
BREAK
END IF
END FOR

IF no PSK matched:
RETURN Access-Reject
END IF

There are several performance considerations to take into account in this model:

High Workload: If the database contains 1,000 PSKs, the worst-case scenario requires 1,000 iterations. Each iteration demands significant CPU work, including PBKDF2 (4096 SHA1 rounds), PRF, and HMAC calculation.
Latency: Typical processing time for a high number of PSKs can lead to an initial connection delay (e.g., 1,000 PSKs requires approximately 5 seconds).
Mitigation Strategies: Pre-compute PMKs for all PSKs; cache computed PTKs based on session parameters; utilize high-performance RADIUS servers; and limit database size per SSID or employ PSK identifiers to narrow the search space.
Key Delivery and Handshake Completion: If a match is found, the RADIUS server sends an Access-Accept, returning the identified PSK (usually encrypted via Tunnel-Password or a proprietary VSA) and the account's associated policies (VLAN, ACLs) to the WAP. The WAP uses this key to verify the MIC and completes the 4WH (Message 3 and 4), applying the derived policies.

Vendor-Specific Implementations in the WPA2 Era

While the mPSK concept is universal, the implementation details vary significantly across vendors, particularly in how they utilize RADIUS attributes to transport keys and enforce policy.

Cisco Identity PSK (iPSK)

Cisco’s implementation, termed Identity PSK (iPSK), is arguably the most widely documented and utilized in large-scale enterprise environments. This mechanism heavily relies on the interaction between the Cisco Wireless LAN Controller (WLC, specifically, the Catalyst 9800 series or legacy AireOS controllers) and the Cisco Identity Services Engine (ISE).

The configuration requires the administrator to enable MAC Filtering on the SSID, which triggers the RADIUS lookup during the association phase. When ISE receives the request, it processes the authorization rules and returns a RADIUS Access-Accept packet containing specific Cisco AV Pairs. The most critical attribute is Cisco-AVPair=psk-mode=ascii, which instructs the controller to interpret the subsequent attribute, Cisco-AVPair=psk=<passphrase>, as the ASCII passphrase for the session.

This architecture allows for extreme granularity. For example, a university could have a single SSID where a printer connects and is assigned a PSK that maps it to the infrastructure VLAN, while a student’s game console connects to the same SSID with a different PSK that maps it to the student’s personal VLAN. The return attributes often include Tunnel-Private-Group-Id to handle the dynamic VLAN assignment seamlessly.

Aruba Multi-Pre-Shared Key (MPSK)

Aruba, a Hewlett Packard Enterprise company, implements this feature under the name MPSK. The architecture is similar to Cisco’s but differs in the specific RADIUS attributes and security handling. Aruba utilizes the ClearPass Policy Manager (CPPM) as the central policy engine.

A distinct characteristic of the Aruba implementation is the handling of the passphrase over the RADIUS protocol. While Cisco’s documentation often references sending the PSK in ASCII within the AV pair, Aruba’s Aruba-MPSK-Passphrase Vendor-Specific Attribute requires the passphrase to be encrypted using the method defined in RFC 2868 (Tunnel-Password encryption). This adds a layer of complexity when integrating with non-Aruba RADIUS servers (like FreeRADIUS), as the server must be explicitly configured to encrypt the VSA using the RADIUS shared secret and the Request Authenticator.

Aruba’s ecosystem also supports "MPSK-Local," where keys are stored directly on the WAP or Gateway, bypassing the RADIUS server. This is particularly useful for smaller branch deployments or when WAN survivability is a concern, though it lacks the centralized management capabilities of ClearPass.

Ruckus Dynamic PSK (DPSK)

Ruckus (CommScope) has long been a pioneer in this space with Dynamic PSK (DPSK). Their implementation is notable for its user-centric workflow, often integrated with their Cloudpath Enrollment System. Unlike the "static" assignment of keys in other systems, Ruckus DPSK was designed to dynamically generate keys and provision them to users via onboarding portals.

In a RADIUS-backed scenario, Ruckus utilizes the Ruckus-DPSK and Ruckus-DPSK-Secret attributes. The workflow allows for the binding of a generated key to a device's MAC address upon the first connection. Ruckus also emphasizes the use of VLAN mapping attributes to segment traffic based on the specific DPSK used, a feature critical for their dominance in the MDU and hospitality sectors. The Ruckus system uses proprietary VSAs (Ruckus-DPSK-params) to communicate EAPOL parameters when using the PSK-Based Identity Lookup model, allowing the RADIUS server to perform the verification locally.

Extreme Networks (Aerohive) Private PSK (PPSK)

Extreme Networks, through its acquisition of Aerohive, utilizes the term Private PSK (PPSK). Aerohive was among the first to popularize this technology, implementing it via a cloud-managed control plane (HiveManager). Their implementation allows for thousands of keys to be pushed to the APs (Cloud PPSK) or managed locally. The RADIUS implementation follows standard conventions, utilizing attributes to map users to user groups and VLANs based on the credential provided.

The Cryptographic Paradigm Shift: WPA3 and SAE

The transition to WPA3 represents a dramatic shift in wireless security, primarily driven by the replacement of the Pre-Shared Key (PSK) exchange with the Simultaneous Authentication of Equals (SAE) protocol. While WPA3-Personal solves the critical security weaknesses of WPA2, specifically offline dictionary attacks and the lack of forward secrecy, it fundamentally breaks the architectural assumptions that allowed mPSK to flourish.

The Mechanics of Simultaneous Authentication of Equals (SAE)

To understand why WPA3 breaks mPSK, one must delve into the SAE handshake, which is based on the Dragonfly key exchange. Unlike WPA2, where the password is essentially a static key used to sign messages, SAE requires an interactive Zero-Knowledge Proof (ZKP). Both the client and the WAP must prove to each other that they know the password without ever revealing it or transmitting any data that could be cracked offline.

The handshake begins with a "Commit" phase. In this phase, both parties map the password to a point on an elliptic curve (or a finite field element). This mapping is deterministic but computationally intensive. Critically, to generate the valid Commit message, the WAP must perform this mathematical derivation using the correct password. In WPA2, the WAP could passively wait for the client's hash and check it against a list. In WPA3, the WAP must actively participate in the cryptographic derivation from the very first packet.

The Collision of mPSK and SAE

This creates a "chicken and egg" problem for mPSK. In a multi-password environment, when a client sends a Commit request, the WAP does not inherently know which password the client is using. Since the WAP cannot simply "try" the password against a received hash (because the SAE protocol prevents offline guessing), the WAP must know the correct password before the handshake begins to derive the correct cryptographic elements.

If the WAP selects the wrong password to derive its Commit message, the handshake will fail immediately. Attempting to iterate through a list of 5,000 keys (generating a Commit message for each one) is computationally prohibitive and would open the WAP to severe Denial of Service (DoS) attacks due to the heavy CPU load required by the Dragonfly algorithm. Consequently, the "try-and-match" flexibility of WPA2 (both Local Key Iteration and PSK-Based Identity Lookup) is mathematically impossible in a standard WPA3-SAE implementation.

WPA3 mPSK: Adaptation Strategies and Vendor Solutions

Faced with the cryptographic rigidity of SAE, network vendors have had to engineer workarounds to maintain mPSK functionality. These solutions almost universally rely on pre-identifying the client to select the correct key before the handshake starts.

The Dominance of MAC-Based Binding

The industry standard solution for WPA3 mPSK is MAC-Based Binding. In this model, the WAP identifies the client based on its MAC address in the initial IEEE Std 802.11 association frames (which are unencrypted). The WAP then looks up this MAC address in a local or remote (RADIUS) database to retrieve the specific passphrase assigned to that device. Once the passphrase is retrieved, the WAP uses it to initiate the SAE handshake.

This approach effectively inverts the logic of WPA2 mPSK. In WPA2, the key identified the user. In WPA3 mPSK, the MAC address identifies the user, and the key is merely a credential verification step. This dependency on the MAC address as a stable identifier introduces significant operational challenges, discussed in the following section.

Vendor-Specific WPA3 Configurations

Juniper Mist Access Assurance

Juniper Mist has implemented a robust WPA3 Multi-PSK solution via its Access Assurance suite. The documentation explicitly states that due to SAE's nature, the MAC address (or OUI) must be pre-associated with the passphrase to ensure a proper key match during authentication. Mist supports up to 5,000 PSKs per site. The configuration involves enabling "Multiple Passphrases" and "RADIUS PSK." When a client connects, the Mist Cloud performs the lookup and returns the key to the WAP using Cisco-AVPair=psk=<passphrase>.

Ruckus DPSK3

Ruckus introduced DPSK3 to specifically address the WPA3 requirement, combining their dynamic key generation with SAE. This typically relies on the MAC address lookup method similar to other vendors, although Ruckus pioneered the WPA2 PSK-based verification method. For Wi-Fi 6E/7 deployments in the 6 GHz band, which mandates WPA3, Ruckus documentation notes that clients may need to connect on the 2.4 GHz or 5 GHz bands first to "bind" the passphrase. This implies the WAP needs to learn the client's identity on a legacy band before successfully negotiating the strict WPA3-SAE handshake on 6 GHz.

Cisco Catalyst 9800 WPA3 iPSK

Cisco supports WPA3 iPSK on the Catalyst 9800 series controllers (IOS-XE 17.2 and later). The configuration remains similar to the WPA2 approach, relying on MAC filtering to trigger the ISE lookup. The controller requires the RADIUS server (like ISE) to return the PSK based on the MAC lookup before the SAE Commit phase can proceed. Cisco supports a "Transition Mode" where WPA2 clients use the legacy method and WPA3 clients use the SAE method, but this is often disabled in high-security environments to prevent downgrade attacks.

Aruba Cloud Auth and MPSK

Aruba's support for WPA3 MPSK has emphasized the MAC-based approach due to SAE's rigidity. ArubaOS 10 introduces "Cloud Auth" which attempts to bridge this gap, but limitations remain. The dependence on ClearPass for the MAC-to-Key mapping is strict, and the passphrase must be returned in an encrypted Aruba-MPSK-Passphrase Vendor-Specific Attribute. Aruba documentation suggests that for full WPA3 security without transition mode, the MAC-based lookup is the only viable path.

The Identity Crisis: MAC Randomization and Operational Friction

The reliance on MAC-based binding for WPA3 mPSK creates a direct conflict with privacy features in modern operating systems: MAC Address Randomization (Private Wi-Fi Addresses).

The Conflict Mechanism

Modern OSs (iOS 14+, Android 10+, Windows 10/11) generate a random, rotating MAC address for each SSID a device connects to. This feature is enabled by default to prevent tracking. In a WPA3 mPSK environment, this behavior is catastrophic:

A user is issued a passphrase (e.g., "StudentKey1") registered to their device's hardware MAC address.
The user attempts to connect to the WPA3 network.
The device generates a random MAC address (e.g., 02:A1:B2...) and presents it to the AP.
The WAP checks its database for 02:A1:B2....
Since the random MAC is not registered, the lookup fails.
The WAP cannot retrieve a key and cannot initiate the SAE handshake.
The connection fails silently or loops infinitely, leaving the user confused.31

OS-Specific Challenges

iOS and iPadOS: Apple devices are aggressive with randomization. If the user "forgets" the network and rejoins, the randomized MAC may change. The only workaround is for the user to manually disable "Private Wi-Fi Address" in the settings for that specific network, a step that creates significant helpdesk friction.
Android: Android 10 and later also default to randomization. While Android supports WPA3 robustly, its randomization logic effectively breaks the "seamless" nature of mPSK unless the user is educated to change the privacy setting to "Use Device MAC".
Windows 10/11: Windows supports WPA3-SAE, but its random hardware address implementation (if enabled) causes similar lookup failures. Furthermore, Windows lacks a native UI for advanced WPA3 features like Password Identifiers, which could theoretically solve this issue.

The "Catch-22" of Onboarding

This creates a Catch-22 for onboarding. To register the correct MAC address, the administrator needs to know it. But the MAC address the device will use depends on the SSID it connects to. If the user hasn't connected yet, they don't know what random MAC will be generated. If they try to connect to find out, the connection fails because the MAC isn't registered. This forces organizations to rely on elaborate onboarding portals (using Open SSIDs with OWE) to capture the MAC before provisioning the secure profile, adding complexity that mPSK was originally designed to avoid.

The Future: SAE Password Identifiers and SAE-PK

The industry acknowledges the limitations of MAC-based binding and has proposed standard-based solutions within the WPA3 specification, though adoption remains nascent.

SAE Password Identifiers

The IEEE Std 802.11-2016 standard defines a "Password Identifier" field for the SAE handshake. This allows the client to send a non-secret string (e.g., "Unit_402" or "IoT_Sensor_Group") alongside the SAE Commit request. The WAP uses this identifier, rather than the MAC address, to look up the correct password.

Advantages: This completely solves the MAC randomization issue. The client explicitly tells the WAP which key to use.
The Barrier: Client support is virtually non-existent in consumer UIs. While the underlying wpa_supplicant in Android and Linux supports this field, the user interface in Android, iOS, and Windows does not provide a text box for users to input a "Password Identifier". Until this field is exposed in the native Wi-Fi connection dialogs of major operating systems, this feature remains theoretically perfect but practically unusable for BYOD.

SAE-PK (Public Key)

Another extension to WPA3 is SAE-PK. This mechanism aims to prevent "Evil Twin" attacks in WPA3-Personal networks. In SAE-PK, the WAP possesses a public/private key pair. The Wi-Fi password is mathematically derived as a fingerprint of the AP's public key. When the client connects, the WAP signs the exchange, and the client verifies the signature against the password (fingerprint).

While SAE-PK significantly enhances security by ensuring the client is connecting to the legitimate WAP (preventing the honing of passwords), it does not inherently solve the multi-user segmentation use case of mPSK. However, it can be combined with Password Identifiers to provide a robust, authenticated, and segmented personal network architecture. Vendor support for SAE-PK is emerging, with Fortinet and others adding support in recent firmware (e.g., FortiOS 7.2/7.4), but client-side enforcement remains the bottleneck.

Comparison of mPSK Architectures

The future of mPSK hangs on the potential adoption of SAE Password Identifiers by OS vendors. Until users can type a "Username" alongside their "Password" for a Personal network, the technology will remain constrained by the physical identity of the device itself.

Strategic Recommendations and Use Case Analysis

Given the complex interplay between WPA3 security, mPSK functionality, and client behavior, network architects must adopt specific strategies based on their environment.

Scenario A: Managed IoT Environments

Profile: Smart locks, temperature sensors, medical devices in a hospital.
Characteristics: Devices are static, do not move often, and do not randomize MAC addresses.
Recommendation: WPA3-Personal with MAC-Based Binding.
Configuration: Register all IoT MAC addresses in the mPSK database (ISE/ClearPass/Mist).
Reasoning: Since MACs are static, the lookup will succeed. WPA3 provides critical protection against offline cracking, which is vital for IoT devices that often use weak, hardcoded passwords. The lack of IEEE Std 802.1X support in IoT makes this the ideal (and often only) secure configuration.

Scenario B: University Dormitories (MDU)

Profile: Students with game consoles, media streamers, and smartphones.
Characteristics: High volume of BYOD, high turnover, expectation of "home-like" experience.
Recommendation: WPA3-Personal with Self-Service Portal.
Configuration: Implement a portal (Ruckus Cloudpath or similar) where students log in with SSO credentials to register their device MACs. Provide clear instructions to disable "Private Wi-Fi Address" for the dorm network.
Reasoning: WPA3 is necessary for privacy in a shared environment. The friction of MAC registration is unavoidable but can be mitigated by self-service tools. Using mPSK allows each student to be mapped to their own micro-segmented VLAN, preventing peer-to-peer attacks.

Scenario C: Corporate Guest / BYOD

Profile: Employee personal phones, guest laptops.
Characteristics: High privacy requirement, random MACs are active.
Recommendation: Abandon mPSK.
Configuration: Use Passpoint (Hotspot 2.0) or Enhanced Open (OWE) for guests. Use EAP-TLS (Certificates) for employee BYOD.
Reasoning: The friction of disabling MAC randomization on personal phones is too high for a seamless experience. Passpoint uses profiles installed on the device to handle secure, seamless authentication without relying on static MAC addresses or shared passwords, effectively bypassing the entire WPA3-SAE mPSK bottleneck.

The 6 GHz Mandate

It is critical to note that the 6 GHz band (Wi-Fi 6E and Wi-Fi 7) mandates the use of WPA3-SAE or OWE. Legacy WPA2-PSK is strictly forbidden. This forces any organization deploying 6 GHz APs to confront the mPSK limitations immediately. There is no "backward compatibility" mode for 6 GHz. Therefore, any mPSK strategy for the future must be built around the constraints of SAE and MAC-based bindings.

Conclusions

The evolution from WPA2 to WPA3 has transformed Multi-Pre-Shared Key technology from a convenient, flexible hack into a rigorous, identity-managed discipline. The "try-and-match" days of WPA2, where a client could anonymously present a key and be slotted into a VLAN, are effectively over. WPA3’s SAE protocol demands that the network knows the client's identity before the first cryptographic handshake is exchanged.

This architectural inversion has placed mPSK in direct conflict with the privacy innovations of the mobile device ecosystem. As MAC randomization becomes ubiquitous, the reliance on MAC addresses as the "index" for retrieving keys becomes the technology's Achilles' heel. While vendors like Cisco, Aruba, Ruckus, and Mist have engineered capable workarounds, they all essentially function by forcing a square peg (anonymous PSK) into a round hole (identity-verified SAE).

For the foreseeable future, mPSK in WPA3 environments will be defined by a strict dichotomy: it will be the "Gold Standard" for managed, headless IoT devices where IEEE Std 802.1X is impossible, but it will increasingly be abandoned for human-operated BYOD in favor of seamless technologies like Passpoint and OWE. Network administrators must plan for this bifurcation, treating mPSK not as a universal catch-all, but as a specialized tool for the static, headless edge of the network.